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Abstract 
 
In the midwestern United States, ethanol produced from corn is mixed with gasoline to meet 
clean air standards. Allocating land to produce clean fuel means taking away land from farming. 
We examine a model in which a scarce fossil fuel (e.g., oil) causes pollution but may be 
substituted by a clean fuel produced from land. Methodologically, we extend the Hotelling model 
to consider a substitute produced in the agricultural sector. We discover a range of prices within 
which the land-based fuel may substitute for the fossil fuel. When land is abundant, the supply of 
the clean fuel may exhibit multiple discontinuities. Environmental regulation may cause food 
production and farm prices to remain constant for a period of time. 
 
JEL classification: Q41, Q42, Q15  
Keywords: Agriculture, Environmental regulation, Hotelling theory, Land use, Pollution  
 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author: Department of Economics, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816,USA and     
University of Toulouse, phone: 407 823 4728, fax 407 823 3269, uchakravorty@bus.ucf.edu. 
2 University of Toulouse I (CEA, LERNA), 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France; 
3 University of Toulouse I (IUF, IDEI and LERNA), 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France. 
  
 2
1. Introduction 
The Ford Motor Company has introduced several types of Flexible Fuel Vehicles (FFVs) that run 
on E85, a mixture of 85% ethanol (made from corn) and 15% gasoline. There are 3.5 million 
FFVs already plying on US highways but only 400 fuelling stations that supply E85. A bill 
passed by the US Senate provides tax credits for building E85 fueling stations. After the bill’s 
passage, United States Sen. Barrack Obama said: “a fuel made of 85 percent Midwestern corn is 
a lot more desirable than one made from 100 percent Middle Eastern Oil.” 
 
The US Environmental Protection Agency is considering regulating a renewable energy standard, 
by which a designated fraction of all gasoline must come from renewable energy sources such as 
ethanol. These trends towards meeting clean energy goals through fuels produced from land 
imply an increased competition for scarce land resources, especially in agriculture. Policy makers 
in the US Midwest, for example are already worried about the effect of rising ethanol 
consumption for energy on food prices (The New York Times, 2006).4 
 
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model that examines this trade-off between producing clean 
energy and using land for food production. The clean energy substitutes for a polluting non-
renewable resource such as oil. We derive an equivalence between Ricardian land rent and the 
Hotelling rent for the nonrenewable resource. We show that the price of the clean fuel produced 
from land must lie within precise bounds dictated by the amount of available land and the 
demands for food and energy. These bounds determine the trigger price at which the land fuel is 
used for energy and the price at which the nonrenewable resource is completely exhausted. 
Supply of the land based fuel may occur in a discontinuous fashion when land is relatively 
abundant. Ricardian rents to land as well as Hotelling rents to oil may increase over time.  
 
We examine how environmental regulation imposed in the form of a limit on the stock of 
pollution may affect the substitution to a land-based fuel. Unlike abatement technologies which 
                                                 
4 “High oil prices are dragging corn prices up with them, as the value of ethanol is pushed up by the value of the fuel 
it replaces,” The New York Times (2006).  
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may be used only when regulation is binding, the land-based fuel may be deployed before the 
pollution stock is binding or later in time when pollution is no longer an issue.    
 
There is a large literature on nonrenewable resources and pollution, including Forster (1980), 
Sinclair (1994), Ulph and Ulph (1994), Farzin (1996), Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), Tahvonen 
(1997) and Toman and Withagen (2000). The focus of these studies has largely been on the time 
path of pollution and carbon taxes. Hoel (1984) examines a model in which a nonrenewable 
resource has a perfect substitute in some of its uses but no substitute in others. He notes that 
resource prices may jump at the time when the substitute production comes into play. The focus 
of his paper is on market structure and price discrimination, not on the relationship between land 
and energy use. Chakravorty, Magne and Moreaux (2006) extend a Hotelling model to explore 
the allocation of a polluting nonrenewable resource and a clean backstop. This paper is an 
extension of their approach, in which we explicitly model land allocation in an agricultural sector 
that may produce both food and clean energy. The land endowment and magnitude of demands 
for food and energy affect substitution between the fossil fuel and the land fuel. On the other 
hand, pollution regulation in the energy sector affects the allocation of land in food production. In 
general, the main contribution of this paper in the literature following Hotelling (1931) is in 
explicitly linking the use of a nonrenewable resource over time to the allocation of land.  
 
Section 2 outlines the basic dynamic model with land. In section 3 we develop intuition by 
examining polar cases of the model in which land is allocated for food alone, for both food and 
fuel after oil is completely depleted, and finally when both food and both sources of energy are 
produced. In section 4, we integrate this land market equilibrium with the dynamic equilibrium in 
the oil market. In section 5, we impose environmental regulation and consider when costly 
pollution control technologies may be deployed. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. The Model 
We consider an economy in which utility U at any given time t is produced from food and 
energy, denoted respectively by fq and eq .
5 Utility is additive and given by the sub-utility 
                                                 
5 In order to prevent notational clutter, we avoid writing the time argument explicitly wherever possible.   
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There are two primary factors, land and a fossil fuel which we call oil. Land is assumed to be 
homogenous in quality, and its endowment is denoted by L . It can be used to produce food or an 
energy crop such as corn that when converted to ethanol, serves as a clean substitute for oil.6 
Let { }y,fi,Li ∈ , be the portion of land dedicated to producing food and energy, respectively. 
Then the residual land 0LLL yf ≥−−  is fallow. Denote by f and y the yield of food and the 
land-based fuel per unit land which is assumed fixed. Their production at any instant of time is 
given by fLf)t(f = and yLy)t(y = . The cost of inputs per unit land area is denoted 
by { }y,fi,ci ∈ . These costs may include the cost of conversion of grain to ethanol. We assume 
that they do not vary with the volume of food or land fuel produced. The average cost per unit 
output is then given by fc f /  and ycy /  respectively. These commodities are not storable, 
except at a prohibitive cost.  
 
Energy can also be produced by using oil. Let )0(X be its initial stock, )t(X the residual stock at 
time t and )t(x its rate of consumption so that )t(x)t(X −=• . Let xc be its average cost7 assumed 
to be constant and lower than the unit cost of the land fuel, ycc yx /< . The land fuel and fossil 
fuel are assumed to be perfect substitutes in final demand so that the total consumption of energy 
at time t is equal to the sum of their extraction rates: )t(x)t(y)t(qe += .8 The land fuel is costly 
                                                 
6 The model may need to be significantly modified to consider energy sources such as wood from tree production 
because harvests tend to be discrete in time. 
7 including the cost of extraction, processing and delivery. 
8 Strictly speaking, this is not an accurate depiction of E85. That would imply strict complementarity of both fuels in 
clean energy production, so that ethanol and oil will be produced in fixed proportions. That is, oil will be directly 
used in the production both fossil and clean energy. As will be clear later, such an extension will make the model 
complicated but may not yield many fresh insights. Both oil and ethanol production must go down over time at 
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and produces no emissions. Letθ be the quantity of pollution (e.g., carbon) released into the 
atmosphere per unit of fossil fuel consumed and )t(Z be this stock at time t, with )0(Z the initial 
stock. As is standard in the literature we assume that there is some natural dilution of pollution 
that is proportional to the stock of pollution, )t(Z . Let 0>α be the natural rate of decay. To keep 
the model simple, we abstract from considering costly pollution abatement policies, but discuss 
this issue later in the paper. The dynamics of pollution is given by )t(Z)t(x)t(Z αθ −=• . 
 
Let Z be the pollution stock quota exogenously imposed by say, an international agreement, so 
that 0)t(ZZ ≥−  at any time t. We define x as the maximum extraction rate of oil when this 
constraint is tight. From 0)t(Z =• and Z)t(Z = , we get θα /Zx = . The objective of the social 
planner is to maximize net aggregate surplus discounted at some constant rate .0>ρ  The planner 
allocates land for food and fuel production, and the scarce fossil fuel to solve the following 
problem (P): 
 
{ } dtexcLcLcyxufuMax txyyffefxLL yf ρ−
+∞
−−−++∫ )()(
0
},,{
    (P) 
 
subject to 
fLf)t(f =  
yLy)t(y =  
,0LLL yf ≥−− 0Ly ≥ , 
0  given, X)0(   , 0 ≥=−=• XXxX , 0≥x , and       
0  given, )0(  , 0 ≥−<=−=• ZZZZZZxZ αθ .     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
constant rates until infinity. Here we implicitly assume that ethanol can be used independently of oil, which may be 
justified as technological improvements increase the content of ethanol to higher than the current 85% or what is 
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The current value Lagrangian is: 
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and the first order conditions are: 
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together with the complementary slackness conditions: 
 
0L  ,0 yyy =≥ γγ ,          (4) 
0x  ,0 xx =≥ γγ ,           (5) 
0)LLL(,0 yf =−−≥ ππ ,         (6) 
 
where xy ,γγ and π are the relevant Lagrangian multipliers. Because of the Inada assumptions, we 
do not need a multiplier for the condition 0Lf ≥ since it will never be binding. There will always 
be land under food production. The dynamics of the costate variables are determined by: 
 
te
x
ρλλρλλρλλ 0              =⇒=⇔∂
∂−= •• l ,       (7) 
( ) ,        νµαρµρµµ ++=⇔∂∂−=
••
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l
 and       (8) 
                                                                                                                                                              
more likely, is that another resource abundantly available, such as coal can be converted to oil and used jointly with 
ethanol.    
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[ ] 0   and  ,0 =−≥ ZZνν          (9) 
 
where )0(0 λλ = . The costate variableµ is non-positive. If ZZ < over some time interval [ ]10 t,t , 
then 0=ν  and ( )( )0tt0 e)t()t( −+= αρµµ , [ ]10 t,tt∈ . Lastly, the transversality conditions at infinity 
are: 
 
,0)t(Xlim)t(X)t(elim
t0
t
t
==
+∞↑
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+∞↑
λλρ        (10) 
.0)t(Z)t(elim t
t
=−
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We will use the term “full marginal cost” to mean the monetary cost of a good augmented by the 
relevant shadow price. The full marginal costs are 
f
c f π+  for food, 
y
cy π+  for the land fuel, and 
θµλ −+xc  for oil. 
 
3. Land Allocation between Competing Uses 
In this section we determine optimal land use and the supply of food and energy. To develop 
intuition, we first examine two polar cases: (i) land is used only for food production and (ii) land 
is used for food and energy when oil is completely exhausted. Finally we consider the general 
case when land is used both for food and energy, in which the latter may be supplied by oil and 
the land fuel simultaneously. 
 
Land is Used only for Food 
Define LLff ≤ as the land parcel under food production if no energy is being produced from land. 
We use the superscript f to denote equilibrium values in this food only model. Then the remaining 
land 0LL ff ≥−  will be fallow. Let fπ be the corresponding rent to land. Then 
fffff c)Lf(uf)L( −′=π . If 0)( >Lfπ , all the land must be in use, so that LLff = . When land is 
abundant or demand for food is low, ffL  solves ( ) 0=−′ fff cLfuf  and equilibrium land rent fπ is 
 8
zero. We will ignore the degenerate case in which rents go to zero exactly when all available land 
is used. We assume that if 0=fπ , then LLff < , some land is always left fallow. 
 
Define fyp  as the full marginal cost of the land fuel when land rents equal
fπ , i.e., 
( ) y/cp fyfy π+≡ . Then ycp yfy /≥ . If the price of energy is less than fyp , land is more 
productive in food production. Hence no clean fuel will be produced and only oil must be used 
for energy. The price fyp thus serves as a lower bound for the price of energy at which land fuel 
production becomes competitive. If fπ is zero, then ycp yfy /= . The trigger price for the land 
fuel is its average cost. 
 
The choice of ffL  is shown in Fig.1. The function
1
fπ corresponds to a situation of low marginal 
product or high marginal cost in which some land is left fallow, and 2fπ  represents the case in 
which all land is used in food production.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Land Use when Oil is Exhausted  
When oil is exhausted, only the land fuel must supply energy. Let yfL  and 
y
yL  be land parcels 
allocated for the production of food and fuel, and yπ the corresponding equilibrium land rent, 
where the superscript ‘y’ denotes equilibrium values for this model. With no oil, pollution is a 
non-issue since emissions are zero. The maximization problem (P) reduces to: 
 
{ } dteLcLc)y(u)f(uMax tyyffef
0
}L,L{ yf
ρ−
+∞
−−+∫       (P1) 
         
subject to  
 
fLf)t(f = , yLy)t(y = , 0LLL yf ≥−− and 0Ly ≥ .       
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The necessary and the complementary slackness conditions are: 
 
π+=′ ff c)f(uf , 
yye cyu γπ −+=′ )(y , 
0≥π  and ,0)LLL( yf =−−π 0≥yγ  and 0=yy Lγ .  
 
With no stock dynamics, (P1) is a static problem. Under the Inada conditions, 0Lyf >  and when 
oil is exhausted, the land fuel must supply energy so that 0Lyy >  and 0=yγ . Let )( yy Lπ  be the 
rent to land allocated for land fuel production, i.e. yyyyy cLyuyL −′= )()(π . All the available 
land will be used for food and energy production if equilibrium land rents are equal and strictly 
positive, i.e., ( ) ( ) 0LLL fyff >−= ππ . This is shown in Fig. 2, in which the equilibrium rent yπ is 
strictly positive. When land is abundant or demands are small, each marginal product may be 
zero, i.e., yfL  solves 0)L( ff =π  and ffyf LL = . In this case land allocated for food is exactly the 
same as in the previous model with no energy production, and yyL solves 0)( =yy Lπ , with 
LLL yy
y
f <+  and the common land rent 0y =π . Some land is left fallow. If equilibrium land rents 
are zero in the model with the land fuel, it can not be strictly positive in the food only case when 
there is no competition for land. That is, we can not have 0y =π and 0>fπ . 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Land Use for Food and Energy when Oil is Available 
We now consider land allocation when oil is still available. Define yyp as the full marginal cost of 
the clean fuel when the land rent is equal to yπ , i.e., 
y
c
p
y
yy
y
π+≡ . Rents must be higher in the 
presence of competing uses, hence fy ππ ≥ . This implies that 
y
c
pp yfy
y
y ≥≥ . We then have 
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y
c
p yfy >  if 0>fπ  and fyyy pp >  if fy ππ > . We will see below that the price of energy is at 
most equal to yyp , the highest price reached once oil is exhausted. If rents are zero both in the 
food only and food and land fuel only models, 0fy == ππ , then some land must be fallow, i.e., 
LLL yf
y
y <+ .9 In the food only model, there is no competition for land, hence rents will achieve 
some lower bound, while in the model with no oil, all energy must come from the land fuel, 
hence rents achieve some upper bound.  
 
Consider energy supply for given energy prices yye pp ≤ . Define )(ˆ epπ  as the land rent for which 
the full marginal cost of the land fuel is equal to the price of energy ep . This price must be at 
least equal to the unit cost of the land fuel, ycy : 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ≤<−
≤= y
yeyye
ye
e ppyccpy
ycp
p
,
,0
)(πˆ  
 
Below we examine three possible cases: 0>fπ ; 0=fπ  and 0>yπ  and finally, 0== yf ππ . 
 
(a) All Available Land is Used under Food Production, 0>fπ : 
When 0>fπ , the demand for food is high or the endowment of land is low. Then 
y
y
f
yy ppyc ≤< . For energy prices fye pp < , we have fep ππ <)(ˆ . Since the rent under food 
production is higher than in fuel production, all the available land must be used to grow food and 
there will be no land fuel supplied to augment the use of oil. For higher energy 
prices [ ]yyfye ppp ,∈ , we have fep ππ >)(ˆ . The land fuel is competitive in the allocation of land, 
hence 0>y  and 0=yγ . Equalisation of land rents implies 
 
yeffp cpycLfuf e −=−′ )(          (12) 
                                                 
9 We neglect the degenerate case when 0fy == ππ  and LLL yfyy =+ . 
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so that 
 
0
)(²
<′′= fe
f
Lfuf
y
dp
dL
.         (13) 
 
A higher price of energy induces a decrease in the land allocated to food and because 
fy LLL −= , an increase in the land allocated to fuel. Let )(ˆ ef pL  be the solution to (12) for 
[ ]yyfye ppp ,∈  and equal zero for fye pp ≤  . Then the supply of landfuel as a function of ep  given 
by )(ˆ epy , is 
 
[ ])p(LˆLy)p(yˆ efe −= .         (14) 
 
Let the portion of energy supplied by oil be denoted by )( ex pd . It must equal the aggregate 
demand for energy net the quantity supplied by the land fuel, )(ˆ)( eee pypd − . To see that 
0)( ≥ex pd , note that because 0>fπ , when fye pp = , we have 0)( >fyx pd  and 0)(ˆ =fypy  and 
when yye pp = , )(ˆ)( yyyye pypd = . Since )( ee pd  is decreasing while )(ˆ epy  is increasing we 
conclude that 0)( ≥ex pd  and )( ex pd  must be decreasing from )( fye pd  at fye pp =  down to zero 
at yye pp = . Furthermore )( ex pd  is continuous at fye pp =  although nondifferentiable. The 
derived demand function for oil, )( ex pd  is illustrated in Fig. 3 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
(b) Land is Fallow under Food Production but not for both Food and Energy, 0=fπ , 0>yπ : 
This case may arise if there is enough land for food production but not for producing both food 
and energy. Or if the demand for food is low relative to the demand for energy. The land rent 
under food production is zero, but not when both food and energy are being produced after the 
exhaustion of oil. Then ycp y
f
y =  and xyfyyy cycpp >=> . This case was illustrated in Fig. 2 
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where the trigger price for land fuel is the unit cost of production ycy . At prices 
ycpp y
f
ye =>  a strictly positive quantity of land fuel is supplied because fey p ππ >)(ˆ . The 
value of Lf  that solves (12) is strictly positive and bounded from above by LLfy < , so that 
( ) 0)p(LˆLlim efycp ye >−↓ implies )p(d)p(yˆlim fyeeycp ye <↓ . When fye pp < , 0)(ˆ =epy . Thus at 
ycp ye = , 0)( =epy  jumps from 0 to ( ) ( ) 0)(ˆlim >−=−↓ ffefycp LLypLLye . The case is 
illustrated in Fig. 4 below. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
(c) Land is Abundant both for Food and Energy, 0yf == ππ : 
Finally suppose land is abundant or the demand for food and energy is small. Then 
ycpp y
y
y
f
y == . For any price of energy ep  that is higher than the trigger price ycy , all energy 
has to be supplied by land and the demand for oil decreases from )( ycd ye  to a value that is 
indeterminate within the interval [ ])(,0 ycd ye . This is the case in which the land fuel acts as a 
pure backstop at the price ycy , as shown in Fig. 5. 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
4. The Land Fuel in a Hotelling Model 
In this section we impose dynamics on the above Ricardian framework. First we consider the 
Hotelling model without any environmental regulation. This is problem (P) without the 
constraint 0≥− ZZ . The modified condition (3) now becomes ( ) xxcyxu γλ −+=+′  and 
conditions (8), (9) and (11) no longer hold. 
 
Since yy
f
yyx ppycc ≤≤< , the interval [ )yyx p,c  is nondegenerate. For any ( )xyy0 cp,0 −∈λ  let 
( )0xp λ  be the Hotelling price of oil which must equal the marginal extraction cost augmented by 
the scarcity rent of the resource, i.e., t0x0x ec)(p
ρλλ += . Let ( )0y λΓ be the time at which this 
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price is equal to yyp , i.e., ]ln)cp[ln()( 0x
y
y
1
0
y λρλΓ −−= − . Then we must have 0
d
d
0
y
>λ
Γ , 
0lim y
cp x
y
y0
=
−↑
Γ
λ
 and +∞=
↓
y
00
lim Γλ . A higher initial Hotelling rent will shorten the date of 
exhaustion of oil.  
 
Let ( )0X λ  be the cumulative consumption of oil over the time interval )](,0[ 0y λΓ along this 
Hotelling price path. The aggregate supply of oil is ( ) ( )∫= 0
y
0
0xx0 dt))(p(dX
λΓ
λλ . We have 0
d
dX
0
<λ , 
0Xlim
x
y
y0 cp
=
−↑λ
 and +∞=
↓
Xlim
00λ
 which suggests that the equation ( ) 00 XX =λ  has a unique 
solution given by the optimal value of the Hotelling rent of oil, absent environmental regulation. 
As a function of 0X , the equilibrium rent is decreasing with 0lim 0X 0
=
∞↑
λ  and xyy0
0X
cplim
0
−=
↓
λ . 
 
Let ( )0x λ and ( )0y λ denote the oil and land fuel consumption paths corresponding to the Hotelling 
price path ( )0xp λ . For ( )xfy0 cp,0 −∈λ , define ( )0f λΓ  as the time at which ( ) fy0x pp =λ , that 
is ( ) ]ln)cp[ln( 0xfy10f λρλΓ −−= − . Then for 0y >π , that includes the two cases 
0fy >> ππ and 0fy => ππ , if )cp,0( xfy0 −∈λ , we have 
 
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≤
<<<
<≤=
=
t)(,0
)(t)(,pdpd
)(t0,pdpd
x
0
y
0
y
0
f
0xe0xx
0
f
0xe0xx
0
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λΓλλ
λ ,  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≤
<<−
<≤
=
t)(,y
)(t)(,pdpd
)(t0,0
y
0
yy
0
y
0
f
0ex0ee
0
f
0
λΓ
λΓλΓλλ
λΓ
λ  
 
where yy
y Lyy = . For ( )xyyxfy0 cp,cp −−∈λ , the phase during which oil supplies all energy 
consumption disappears. The unit cost of the land fuel is lower than the full marginal cost of oil. 
When 0f >π , the case shown in Fig. 3, oil supplies all the energy until the Hotelling price equals 
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the trigger price fyp . Above this price, the supply of oil is augmented by fuel from land. The 
supply of the land fuel increases until oil is completely exhausted at price yyp , as shown in Fig. 6. 
When 0f =π  but 0y >π , the supply of the land fuel is as shown in Fig.4. Oil supply is positive 
in the entire price range ( )yyfy pp , . Oil is exhausted when the price reaches yyp . Finally, when 
0y =π , then ycpp yfyyy == , the land fuel acts as a pure backstop resource. Only oil is supplied 
until time yf ΓΓ = , shown in Fig. 7. The intermediate phase of simultaneous extraction that 
occurred previously disappears. 
 
[Figures 6 and 7 here] 
 
5. Use of the Clean Energy under Environmental Regulation 
Consider a cap on the stock of emissions. This constraint can be relaxed either by reducing the 
use of oil, supplying energy from land or by costly pollution abatement. The land fuel is more 
costly than oil, and supplying it reduces the consumption of food when land is scarce. We first 
examine a model with no pollution abatement. 
 
We distinguish between the solution values of the variables in the model absent any regulation 
and the model with regulation. Let H0λ be the optimal scarcity rent in the regulation free model. 
Then ( )H0HZ λ  is the time path of the pollution stock induced by oil extraction rate ( )H0x λ  when the 
initial stock is 0Z and there is no pollution cap.10 We assume that the ceiling constraint is binding 
along this standard Hotelling path. Beyond ( )H0y λΓ , no fossil fuel is used and HZ falls smoothly 
to zero. The binding constraint may be stated as ( ) ( )[ ]{ } .,0, 00 ZtZMax HyHH ≤Γ∈ λλ  
                                                 
10 Formally HZ solves the differential equation ( ) ( ) .ZZ , Z x
dt
dZ 0H
0
H
0
HH
0
H
=−= λαλθ  For xfyH cp −<0λ , the 
extraction rate ( )H0x λ  is not differentiable (is discontinuous) at time fΓ when the price of oil is fyp  and 0>fπ  
(=0). Then we must first solve this differential equation over the time interval [ ))(,0 H0f λΓ . Let H )( H0fZ λΓ  be the 
limit of HZ as )(t H0
f λΓ↑ . Next solve the same equation over the time interval [ )∞),( H0f λΓ  taking H fZΓ  as 
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If τ is the final instant of time at which the constraint is tight, then 0)t( =µ  beyond time τ . 
Beyondτ  the environmental constraint no longer binds and resources are allocated as in a 
Hotelling model. Let τ  be the first time instant at which the ceiling constraint is binding 
( ZZ 0 < implies 0>τ ). Over the time interval [ )τ,0  the constraint is not binding but will later in 
time. Since 0>− ZZ  then 0=υ  so that ( )te αρµµ += 0  with 00 <µ  and the full cost of the fossil 
fuel is denoted by ep
(  such that ( )t0t0x00e eec),(p αρρ µλµλ +−+=( . Let ),(Z 00 µλ( be the path of the 
stock of pollution corresponding to the price path ),( 00 µλep( , i.e., the path defined by 
( )( ) .  ,  , 0000 ZZZpddtZd ex =−=
(((
(
αµλθ  
 
The land fuel may be economically feasible according to whether the constrained oil extraction  
at the ceiling x ( )θα /Z=  is higher or lower than demand at the trigger price given by ( )fye pd . 
The intuition is that if ( )fye pdx > , then the constraint is not tight enough or the opportunity cost 
of the land fuel is relatively high so that using land to provide supplementary clean energy in 
order to satisfy the constraint is cost prohibitive. In other words, the price at which the 
consumption of oil is constrained is lower than the lowest opportunity cost of the land fuel fyp . 
We re-examine the three cases discussed earlier from the point of view of environmental 
regulation:  
 
(a) All Available Land is Used under Food Production, 0>fπ : 
Here xy
f
y
y
y cycpp >>>  and the demand for oil xd is continuous at the trigger price fyp . The 
price ep  at which ( ) xpd ex =  is well defined. If fye pp > , as shown in Fig. 8, the land fuel is 
competitive at prices ( )efye ppp ,∈ . It is used along with oil before regulation becomes binding. 
Both fuels are also used at the ceiling. There is an initial phase during which the stock is lower 
than the ceiling and the price of fuel is given by ),(p 00e µλ( . This phase may include a segment 
                                                                                                                                                              
the initial condition and ( )ex
pp
pdlim
f
ye ↓
 as the initial demand. The path HZ is continuous at time )(t H0
f λΓ= but 
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during which both fuels are used simultaneously. At time 0t = , fy00e p),(p <µλ( , as shown in the 
figure. If fy00e p),(p >µλ( then both fuels must be used from the beginning. During this initial 
phase the pollution stock Z
(
is increasing. The ceiling is attained at timeτ at which ZZ =),( 00 µλ(  
and ee pp =),( 00 µλ( . 
 
At the ceiling, the price of fuel is constant at ep . Oil consumption is constrained at x and land fuel 
consumption is given by ( ) ( ) 0pdpdy exee >−= . During this time µ is increasing, i.e., decreasing 
in absolute value. At the end of this phase at τ=t , pollution is no longer an issue and 0=µ for 
the rest of the planning horizon. The next phase is a pure Hotelling phase during 
which )(pp 0xe λ= . Oil consumption is decreasing but land fuel supply is increasing in response 
to the rise in prices. At time )(t 0
y λΓ= , oil is exhausted. Beyond this time, the land fuel is the 
only source of energy.11 
 
[Figure 8 here] 
 
Before the land fuel is produced, land is allocated only for food. When supply of the land fuel 
begins, land allocated to food production declines until the pollution stock hits the ceiling. At the 
ceiling, the supply of the clean fuel is constant, hence food production and prices are also 
constant. Once the ceiling is no longer constrained, food production continues to decline until it 
reaches a steady state at )(t 0
y λΓ= . Environmental regulation leads to constant food output and 
prices for a time period. If there was no regulation, the decline in food production would be 
gradual until oil was exhausted and land fuel supply was at its maximum level.  
When the price at the ceiling is lower than the minimum price at which land fuels become 
economical, only oil is consumed at the ceiling and the land fuel is supplied after the ceiling 
period is completed.12  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
not differentiable.   
11 See Appendix A for technical details of this solution. 
12 For reasons of space, this case is not illustrated in the paper.  
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(b) Land is Fallow under Food Production but not for both Food and Energy, 0=fπ , 0>yπ : 
In this case if ( )ex
pp
pdlimx
f
ye ↓
< , then fye pp > , so the land fuel is used at the ceiling. But if 
( )fye pdx > , then fye pp <  and the clean fuel is used only in the post-ceiling period. However, 
if ( ) ( )fyeex
pp
pdxpdlim
f
ye
<<
↓
 and ( )fyx pd is not well defined at fye pp = , there is a jump discontinuity 
when the energy price equals fyp . As shown in Fig. 9, at the end of the first phase oil 
consumption is discontinuous and falls from )p(d fye to x . The deficit is supplied by land fuel. 
There is no impact on food production because aggregate production of the land fuel is less than 
what available land can produce, given by )p(dlim)p(d ex
pp
f
ye f
ye ↓
− . Part of the land is fallow from 
the beginning until time τ  when oil consumption falls again from x to )p(dlim ex
pp fye ↓
and clean fuel 
consumption jumps up by the same amount. The land constraint now becomes binding. Oil is 
exhausted and the supply of the land fuel increases to yy , with aggregate energy consumption 
declining due to the increase in the price of energy. Food consumption decreases from ff to yf .13 
There are two jumps in the supply of the clean fuel, at time τ andτ . 
 
(c) Land is Abundant both for Food and Energy, 0yf == ππ : 
The analysis is the same as before except when 0)p(d ex =  for yyfye ppp => . See Fig. 10 for the 
case )p(dx fye< . Supply of the land fuel starts exactly at the ceiling and there is no Hotelling 
phase after the ceiling. Oil supply exhibits a discontinuity from )p(d fye  to x . The difference is 
supplied by the clean fuel but all available land is not utilized. Oil is exhausted exactly at 
                                                 
13 The optimal values of 0λ , 0µ ,τ ,τ and yΓ  are determined as in the previous case. The cumulative 
consumption/supply balance equation of the fossil fuel can be written as 
[ ] 00
0
00 ))(()),(( Xdtpdxdtpd
y
xxee =+−+ ∫∫
Γ
τ
τ
λττµλ( . 
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timeτ when the land fuel supply jumps up from x)p(d fye −  to ffye y)p(d = , which lasts until 
infinity.14 
 
[Figure 10 here] 
 
The clean fuel may work as a textbook backstop resource and may not supplement the fossil fuel, 
as illustrated in Fig. 11 where )()( ycdpdx ye
f
ee => . Define ep  as the price at which 
xpd ee =)( . At time yΓ , oil is exhausted, its consumption falling from )()( ycdpd yefyx =  to 
zero and is completely replaced by the land fuel.  
 
[Figure 11 here] 
 
The Clean Fuel and Costly Pollution Control 
In this section, we investigate the relationship between using land to produce clean energy and 
alternative pollution control policies such as through more efficient appliances (e.g., scrubbers). 
We focus only on the intuition.15 Suppose the stock of pollution can be reduced through costly 
abatement, denoted by a . The average abatement cost, denoted by ac , is assumed constant. Then 
the total instantaneous abatement cost is equal to aca and the new dynamics of the pollution stock 
is given by ZaxZ αθ −−=• . With abatement, the new maximum extraction rate of oil at the 
ceiling will be )(ax where θα )Za()a(x += . When 0=a , we get back the original extraction 
rate .x The optimization program (P) must now be modified by including abatement a as a choice 
variable. This new program (P2) yields the following additional conditions:  
 
                                                 
14 This solution is characterized by the values of the variables 0λ , 0µ ,τ andτ  that solve the following system of 
four equations: the cumulated demand/supply balance equation 0
0
00ee X][xdt)),(p(d =−+∫ ττµλ
τ (
; the 
pollution stock continuity equation at τ : Z),(Z 00 =µλ( ; the price continuity equations at τ , τ  :  
)(),( 00 ycppp y
y
y
f
ye ===µλ(  at τ=t  and )()( 0 ycppp yyyfyx ===λ  at τ=t . 
15 Technical details are provided in Appendix B. 
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aac        0a
γµ −=−⇔=∂
∂l          (15) 
0≥aγ  and 0 =aaγ ,          (16) 
 
where aγ is a Lagrangian multiplier. Define )(p~ 0e λ as the full marginal cost of the clean fossil 
fuel including the marginal cost of abatement but excluding the shadow cost of the ceiling 
constraint: a
t
0x0e cec)(p~ θλλ ρ ++= . Abatement will not occur if the full marginal cost with 
abatement is higher than the one with no abatement. There is no benefit from abating when the 
stock of pollution is strictly below the ceiling. Suppose, abatement occurs at time τ<t , before 
attaining the ceiling. Then ( )te αρµµ += 0 , ),0[t τ∈ . Since 0>a , ),0[t τ∈ , then 0a =γ  over this 
interval. Together with (15) this implies that ac=− µ . Both ( )t0e)t( αρµµ +=  and ac−=µ , 
[ )τ,0t∈  cannot be true, hence we arrive at a contradiction. Abatement must occur only at the 
ceiling. Abatement is costly and reducing pollution when the constraint is not binding confers no 
additional benefit.  
 
Abatement must also occur only at the beginning of the ceiling period, if at all. By definition, the 
marginal cost of oil under abatement )(p~ 0e λ is upward sloping, since it depends upon the price of 
oil. If abatement were optimal, then this graph must cut the horizontal ceiling price ep at some 
time period, sayτ~ . Before this time, the abatement marginal cost is below ep hence abatement is 
economical, and afterτ~ , the marginal cost is above ep , hence abatement becomes too expensive. 
Given that the unit cost of pollution control is constant and the ceiling is tight, the earlier it is 
done the better, since that allows increased use of cheap oil earlier in time.  
 
In summary, there is a clear distinction between the two options for pollution reduction. 
Abatement may happen only at the ceiling and must commence at the beginning. The use of the 
land fuel may start before the ceiling, and once energy production from land begins, it will 
always be part of the fuel mix. This is because the scarcity of oil drives the price of oil higher, 
making the land fuel relatively cheaper over time. The land fuel may be supplied starting from 
before the ceiling is binding, interior to the ceiling or after the ceiling no longer holds.   
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7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we develop a Hotelling model with a market for land that drives the supply of clean 
energy. We discover a range of energy prices within which the land-based fuel may substitute for 
the fossil fuel. Depending on whether land is abundant and the magnitude of demands for food 
and energy, the supply of the land fuel may occur discontinuously, and before or after 
environmental regulation is binding. Regulation causes the price of energy to increase, therefore 
more land is allocated away from food production. However, if the demand for energy is high, 
then regulation forces food production and prices to remain constant over an extended time 
period. 
 
The proposed framework can be used to make informed predictions on how agricultural policies 
may affect the supply of clean energy from land that substitutes for a non-renewable resource 
such as oil in transportation. Policies that decrease the demand for food will lead to an increase in 
the supply of the clean energy. These may include the removal of export subsidies on the 
domestic agricultural sector and import tariffs for agricultural products. Technological change in 
food production (e.g., introduction of high-yielding varieties) that increases profits per unit of 
land will lead to a substitution of land away from energy into food production and a consequent 
increase in the price of energy. In the other direction, environmental policies in the energy sector 
may also affect the land market equilibrium. If demand for energy were to increase and then 
decline exogenously, because of changes in population and economic growth, the land fuel may 
be supplied in an initial period and then the economy may switch back to oil, leading to an 
increase in food production and a decrease in the price of food. There may be a period in the 
interim when food production goes to zero and all land is used to produce energy, with the bulk 
of agriculture shifting into imports. However domestic production may come back if energy 
demand declines in the future. In an international context, environmental regulation in developed 
economies may cause an increase in food prices, leading to increased imports from developing 
countries. Domestically, there may be a shift in land use from other sectors into the production of 
food and energy. 
 
In future work it may be important to consider Ricardian land with differential quality. The 
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scarcity of land may drive up food and energy prices, which in turn may determine equilibrium 
land qualities in each sector as well as technological progress in these sectors, assumed constant 
in this model. In a global economy, differential land qualities and demands may dictate the 
optimal allocation of food production as well as land-based pollution control activities such as 
sequestration through forestry. 
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Appendix A 
 
We determine the values of the two rents 0λ  and 0µ  and the three dates τ , τ  and )( 0y λΓ that solve the 
following five equations system: the cumulative demand/supply balance for oil, 
( ) [ ] ( ) 0)( 00 00 0)( Xdtecdxdteecd y txxttxx =++−+−+ ∫∫ Γ+ λτ ραρτ ρ λττθµλ  ; the pollution stock 
continuity equation at τ , Z),(Z 00 =µλ(  ; the price continuity equations at τ , τ  and yΓ : 
( ) ee pp =00 ,µλ(  at τ=t , ( ) fyx pp =0λ  at τ=t , and ( ) yyx pp =0λ  at )( 0λyt Γ= . For any set of 
solution values for these variables 0λ , 0µ ,τ ,τ  and )( 0λyΓ , there exists values of the multipliers such 
that all the first order conditions are satisfied by: 
 
( )
( )( )
( )( )
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Γ<≤
<<
<≤
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)(,)(ˆ
)(,ˆ
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0,,ˆ
)(
0
00
00
λ
λτλ
ττ
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. 
where )(ˆ ef pq  is optimal food production for a given energy price ep , i.e., )(ˆ)(ˆ efef pLfpq ≡ . It is easy 
to check that the nonnegative functions µπγγ −,,, yx  and ν satisfy the necessary conditions (1)-(11). 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
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0,0
0λγ  
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Appendix B 
 
 
Checking the optimality of an active abatement policy 
 
Let the subscript na (no abatement) denote equilibrium values in the model with no abatement, where the 
variables are denoted by na0λ , na0µ and naτ . Let naep~ denote the function )(~ 0λep and naep(  the function 
),(p 00e µλ( , for na0λ and na0µ . The no abatement policy is optimal if and only if 0,~ ≥≥ tpp naenae ( . In the 
initial phase before the ceiling with 0>x , the price path naep  is given by naep(  until time nat τ= , 
followed by a period when the ceiling is constrained during which naep  is constant and equal to either ep  
or fyp , and there may exist a third phase with
na
ep  as the Hotelling path with a
nana
x
na
e cppp −== ~ .16 
 
                                                 
16 The condition natna0x
na
e ecp θµλ ρ −+= always holds although the value of naµ may change from one phase to 
another.                                                                        
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Let nae
na
e pp
(<~ over some time interval that includes τ , say ),( 21 ετετ +− nana , 2,1,0 => iiε . Assume 
it is optimal not to abate and consider the interval during which nanae pp
(= . Since 0>x , then by (15), 
and 0a ≥γ , we have µ−≥ac  so that naenae pp (≥~ , which is a contradiction. Thus it is optimal to abate. 
 
However, consider the case when .0,~ ≥≥ tpp naenae (  At any time t such that 0>x , 0=aγ , naenae pp~ >  
which implies tac µ−> . By (15), aac γµ +−=  and the preceding inequalities hold if and only if 
0a >γ , i.e., if and only if 0=a . Thus it is optimal not to abate. The constrained solution with no 
abatement is indeed the first best solution. In this case, the graph of naep~ shifts up and cuts the graph of 
na
ep
(  beyond time naτ . 
 
 
Determining  the characteristics of the optimal path 
Assume it is optimal to abate. We may have different scenarios according to the values of fyp ,  
y
yp  and 
ep , one of which is illustrated in Fig B1. τ is the time at which the ceiling begins to be active and 
abatement begins, δ  the time at which the abatement must end andτ  the time at which the ceiling 
constraint ceases to be active. 
 
[Figure B1 here] 
 
We need to solve for 0λ , 0µ , τ , δ , τ  and yΓ  from the following system of six equations: the 
cumulative demand/supply balance equation for oil given by 
( )( ) [ ] ( )( ) 000 00 , Xdtpdxdtpd
y
xxex =+−+ ∫∫ Γτδ λδτµλ( ; the pollution stock continuity equation at τ , the 
time at which the ceiling is attained, ZZ =),( 00 µλ( ; the price continuity equations - at time τ : 
( ) ( )000 ~, λµλ ee pp =( ; time δ : ( ) ee pp =0~ λ ; time τ  : ( ) ex pp =0λ and time yΓ : ( ) yyx pp =0λ .  
 
 
In Fig. B1 we assume that e
f
y pp <  and that fyp  is lower than ( )00 ,µλp(  at time τ . We denote by bt the 
time at which ( ) fypp =00 ,µλ( . Hence the ceiling constraint is first relaxed by both pollution abatement 
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and use of the land fuel followed only by the latter. But for a higher trigger price fyp , still lower than ep , 
we could have three phases at the ceiling: first abatement, next abatement and use of land fuel and finally 
use of the land fuel only. For e
f
y pp > , the only option is to abate.  
 
List of Symbols 
 
U: utility function or gross surplus, ef uuU +≡  
)( ii qu , { }efi ,∈ : gross surplus generated by good i 
)q(u ii′ denoted by pi , { }efi ,∈  
L : land endowment 
{ }y,fi,Li ∈ : land allocated to good i,  0LLL yf ≥−−   
y : quantity of land fuel 
f , y  : yields per unit of land, ff Lfq = , yLyy =  
fc , yc : cost per unit of land 
fc f / , ycy / : cost per unit output 
X : stock of fossil fuel, 0X  initial stock 
)t(x : extraction rate of fossil fuel 
xyqe +=  
π : land rent 
λ : scarcity rent of oil, 0λ : initial value, teρλλ 0=  
Z : stock of pollutant 
Z : pollution cap: 0)t(ZZ ≥−  
θ : pollution per unit of fossil fuel 
a : abatement 
α : natural regeneration rate of pollution 
0  given, )0(  , 0 ≥−<=−=• ZZZZZZxZ αθ  
θα )Za()a(x += : constrained oil consumption when ZZ = , )0(xx ≡  
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µ : shadow cost of the pollutant stock, 0µ  initial value 
ac : unit cost of abatement 
t
0x0x ec)(p
ρλλ +=  
a
t
0x0e cec)(p~ θλλ ρ ++=  
( )t
0
t
0x00e eec),(p
αρρ µλµλ +−+=(  
If land is allocated only to food production, then 
f
fL : land allocated to food production 
fπ : land rent 
( ) y/cp fyfy π+≡ : full marginal cost of land fuel for fππ =  
If land is allocated to both food and fuel production, then 
y
fL , 
y
yL  : land allocated to food and fuel, respectively 
yπ : land rent 
( ) ycp yyyy /π+≡ : full marginal cost of land fuel for yππ =  
fffff cLfufL −′≡ )()(π : land rent for land under food production 
yyyyy cLyuyL −′≡ )()(π : land rent for land under fuel production, absent fossil fuel 
( ) ]ln)cp[ln( 0xfy10f λρλΓ −−= − , defined for ( )xfy cp −∈ ,00λ  
]ln)cp[ln()( 0x
y
y
1
0
y λρλΓ −−= − , defined for ( )xyy cp −∈ ,00λ  
For a given price of energy ep , 
)(ˆ ef pL , )(ˆ ey pL : land allocation when rents are equal for food and fuel 
)(ˆ epπ : land rent 
)(ˆ)(ˆ eye pLypy = : output of land fuel 
)(ˆ)(ˆ efef pLfpq = : output of food 
)(ˆ)()( eeeex pypdpd −≡ : residual demand for oil 
)( 0λx : oil consumption along path ( ) ( ) ( )( )000 λλλ xxx pdxp ≡=  
)( 0λy : oil consumption along path ( ) ( ) ( )( )000 ˆ: λλλ xfx pLyyp ≡  
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Fig 1. Land is used only for Food 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Land is used both for Food and Clean Energy 
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Fig 3. Energy Supply when Land is Scarce or Demand for Food is High 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4. Energy Supply with Abundant Land or Low Demand for Food 
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Fig 5. Oil Demand when Land is Abundant or the Demand for Energy is Low 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6. Energy Supply from Land increases monotonically 
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Fig 7. Energy from Land acts as a pure Backstop Resource 
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Fig 8. Land Supplies Energy before Regulation Binds 
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Fig 9. Multiple Discontinuities in the Supply of the Land Fuel 
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Fig 10. Oil is Exhausted exactly when Regulation ceases to Bind 
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Fig 11. Fuel from Land is expensive: Only Oil is used under Regulation 
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Fig B1. Abatement must start exactly when the Ceiling is achieved, if at all 
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